Abstract-We study price competition among primaries in a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) with multiple primaries and secondaries located in a large region. In every slot, each primary has unused bandwidth with some probability, which may be different for different primaries. Also, there may be a random number of secondaries. A primary can lease out its unused bandwidth to a secondary in exchange for a fee. Each primary tries to attract secondaries by setting a lower price for its bandwidth than the other primaries. Radio spectrum has the distinctive feature that transmissions at neighboring locations on the same channel interfere with each other, whereas the same channel can be used at far-off locations without mutual interference. So in the above price competition scenario, each primary must jointly select a set of mutually non-interfering locations within the region (which corresponds to an independent set in the conflict graph representing the region) at which to offer bandwidth and the price at each location. In this paper, we analyze this price competition scenario as a game and seek a Nash Equilibrium (NE). For the game at a single location, we explicitly compute a NE and prove its uniqueness. Also, for the game at multiple locations, we identify a class of conflict graphs, which we refer to as mean valid graphs, such that the conflict graphs of a large number of topologies that commonly arise in practice are mean valid. We explicitly compute a NE in mean valid graphs and show that it is unique in the class of NE with symmetric independent set selection strategies of the primaries.
which it would like to sell to secondaries. Now, secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer it at a low price, which results in price competition among the primaries. If a primary quotes a low price, it will attract buyers, but will earn lower profit per sale. This is a common feature of an oligopoly [21] , in which multiple firms sell a common good to a pool of buyers. Price competition in an oligopoly is naturally modeled using game theory [22] , and has been extensively studied in economics using, for example, the classic Bertrand game [21] and its variants.
However, a CRN has several distinguishing features, which makes the price competition very different from oligopolies encountered in economics. First, in every slot, each primary may or may not have unused bandwidth available. Second, the number of secondaries will be random and not known apriori as each secondary may be a local spectrum provider or even a user shopping for spectrum in a futuristic scenario, e.g., users at airports, hotspots, etc. Thus, each primary who has unused bandwidth is uncertain about the number of primaries from whom it will face competition as well as the demand for bandwidth; it may only have access to imperfect information such as statistical distributions about either. A low price will result in unnecessarily low revenues in the event that very few other primaries have unused bandwidth or several secondaries are shopping for bandwidth, because even with a higher price the primary's bandwidth would have been bought, and vice versa. Third, spectrum is a commodity that allows spatial reuse: the same band can be simultaneously used at far-off locations without interference; on the other hand, simultaneous transmissions at neighboring locations on the same band interfere with each other. Thus, spatial reuse allows primaries to sell the same band to secondaries at different locations, thereby increasing their profit, subject to satisfying the interference constraints. So when multiple primaries own bandwidth in a large region, each needs to select a set of non-interfering locations in the region, which corresponds to an independent set in the conflict graph representing the region, at which to offer bandwidth. This is another source of strategic interaction among the primaries-each primary prefers to select a maximum-sized independent set to offer bandwidth at; however, if a large number of primaries offer bandwidth at the same locations, there is intense competition at those locations. So a primary would have benefited by instead offering bandwidth at a smaller independent set and charging high prices at those locations.
Pricing related issues have been extensively studied in the context of wired networks and the Internet; see [3] for an overview. Price competition among spectrum providers in wireless networks has been studied in [6] , [19] , [20] , [23] , [24] , [29] . Specifically, Niyato et al. analyze price competition among multiple primaries in CRNs [23] , [24] . However, neither 0018-9286 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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uncertain bandwidth availability, nor spatial reuse is modeled in any of the above papers. Also, most of these papers do not explicitly find a Nash Equilibrium (NE) (exceptions are [19] , [23] ). Our model incorporates both uncertain bandwidth availability and spatial reuse, which makes the problem challenging; despite this, we are able to explicitly compute a NE. Zhou et al. [30] have designed double auction based spectrum trades in which an auctioneer chooses an allocation taking into account spatial reuse and bids. However, in the price competition model we consider, each primary independently sells bandwidth, and hence a central entity such as an auctioneer is not necessary. In the economics literature, the Bertrand game [21] and several of its variants [2] , [7] , [16] , [17] , [25] have been used to study price competition. Osborne et al [25] consider price competition in a duopoly, when the capacity of each firm is constrained. Chawla et al. [2] consider price competition in networks where each seller owns a capacity-constrained link, and decides the price for using it; the consumers choose paths they would use in the networks based on the prices declared and pay the sellers accordingly. The capacities in both cases are deterministic, whereas the availability of bandwidth is random in our model. The closest to our work are [7] , [16] , which analyze price competition where each seller may be inactive with some probability, as also our prior work [8] in which we analyzed price competition in a CRN. The above body of work [7] , [8] , [16] however suffers from the limitation that they consider only the symmetric model where the bandwidth availability probability of each seller is the same. Also, [7] , [16] consider primaries and secondaries located at a single location (i.e., no spatial reuse), and in addition, the results in [7] , [16] are restricted to the case of one buyer, whereas a CRN is likely to have an unknown and random number of secondaries, which we consider in this paper. Characterizing the Nash Equilibrium (NE) in either asymmetric games (i.e., when different primaries have different bandwidth availability probabilities in our context) or in games over graphs (i.e., in presence of spatial reuse in our context) is usually quite challenging, and the combination of the above often turns out to be analytically intractable. This is the space where we seek to contribute in this paper.
We consider price competition in a CRN with multiple primaries and multiple secondaries, where each primary has available bandwidth in a slot with a certain probability, which may be different for different primaries. ( We refer to this model as the "asymmetric bandwidth availability probabilities model" to contrast it with the symmetric model considered in our prior work [8] , in which the bandwidth availability probability of each primary is the same.) Also, the number of secondaries may be random and unknown to the primaries, with only their distribution being known. First, we analyze the case of primaries and secondaries in a single location (Section II). Since prices can take real values, the strategy sets of players are continuous. In addition, the utilities of the primaries are not continuous functions of their actions. Thus, classical results, including those for concave and potential games, do not establish the existence and uniqueness of NE in the resulting game, and there is no standard algorithm for finding a NE. Nevertheless, we are able to explicitly compute a NE and show that it is unique in the class of all NE, even allowing for player strategies that are arbitrary mixtures of continuous and discrete probability distributions (Section II). The analysis becomes particularly challenging since different primaries may use different strategies owing to the potential asymmetry and must rely on system specific arguments which a symmetric analysis need not resort to. Our analysis reveals that the structure of the NE turns out to be substantially different from that for the case of symmetric bandwidth availability probabilities of the primaries.
We subsequently model the scenario where each primary owns bandwidth across multiple locations using a conflict graph in which there is an edge between each pair of mutually interfering locations (Section III). Each primary must simultaneously select a set of mutually non-interfering locations (independent set) at which to offer bandwidth and the prices at those locations. We focus on a class of conflict graphs that we denote as mean valid graphs; it turns out that the conflict graphs of a large number of topologies that arise in practice are mean valid. We show that the independent set selection probabilities in the mean valid graphs can be computed in a manner similar to that in the symmetric case investigated in [8] . Furthermore, we show that the asymmetry in channel availability probabilities does not alter the structure of the independent set selection strategy. We show that a mean valid graph has a unique NE in the class of NE with symmetric independent set selection strategies of the primaries (Section III-C). Also, this NE has a simple form and the NE strategies can be explicitly computed by solving a system of equations that we provide. We also prove that in the limit as the numbers of primaries and secondaries go to infinity, the NE structure exhibits interesting threshold behavior: in particular, the efficiency of this NE, which is the ratio of the aggregate revenue of all the primaries under the NE and the maximum possible aggregate revenue, changes from 1 to 0 as the average bandwidth availability increases relative to the average bandwidth demand at each location. Also, interestingly, while the NE price selection strategies at individual locations for the asymmetric bandwidth availability probabilities model substantially differ from the symmetric counterpart, the independent set selection strategies for the asymmetric model turn out to be similar to those for the symmetric counterpart and may be obtained by generalizing the techniques developed in the symmetric case. Thus, the asymmetricity substantially alters only one part of the selection process.
Finally, our results more generally apply to any setting where the sellers' supply is uncertain. In particular, microgrids [18] are a newly emerging technology for distributed electricity generation, which consist of a connected network of generators (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines) and loads (e.g., households, factories). There is uncertainty in the power generated by a generator at a given time, e.g., the power produced by a solar panel on a given day depends on the availability of sunlight. Our results characterize NE in pricing games in such electricity markets [10] [11] [12] .
Parts of this paper appeared in [13] , [14] and [15] . This paper contains the proofs of several of the analytical results stated in the paper, which were omitted from [13] [14] [15] . Also, it contains detailed discussions on the insights that the analytical results provide, explains a number of ways by which the spectrum trade among primaries and secondaries analyzed in this paper can be implemented, and includes additional numerical results in Section IV. Finally, the presentation and clarity have been improved throughout the paper.
II. SINGLE LOCATION
In this section, we analyze price competition for the case when all the primaries and secondaries are present in a single location. We present the model in Section II-A. In Section II-B, we state some necessary conditions that any profile of NE strategies must satisfy. In Section II-C, we note that these conditions are sufficient and also explicitly compute the NE and show its uniqueness. In Section II-D, we discuss the insights that the structure of this NE provides and in Section II-E, we prove the analytical results in Section II-B and C.
A. Model
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 primaries in a location, each of whom owns one channel. The channels owned by the primaries are all orthogonal to each other. Time is divided into slots of equal duration. In a given slot, a primary may or may not have subscriber demand to satisfy, independently of the other primaries. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let q i ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that primary i does not use its channel in a slot (to satisfy its subscriber demand). Without loss of generality, we assume that
Each secondary may be a spectrum provider or even a user seeking to lease spectrum bands to transmit data on an ondemand basis. In practice, the number of secondaries seeking to buy bandwidth may be random and a priori unknown to the primaries, due to user mobility, varying bandwidth requirements of the secondaries, etc. Thus, the number of secondaries seeking to buy bandwidth (henceforth referred to as the number of secondaries for simplicity), say K, is a random variable with probability mass function (p.m.f.) P r(K = k) = γ k . The primaries apriori know only the γ k s, but not the value of K. We will make some technical assumptions on the p.m.f. {γ k }: (i) n−1 k=0 γ k > 0 (i.e., the total number of primaries exceeds the number of secondaries with positive probability, but not necessarily probability 1) (ii) if γ 0 > 0, then γ 1 > 0 (if the event that no secondary requires bandwidth has positive probability, then the event that only 1 secondary requires bandwidth also has positive probability). A large class of probability mass functions, including those generated from the most common scenario, where each local provider or user from a given pool requires bandwidth with a positive probability independent of others, satisfy both the above assumptions.
A primary i who has unused bandwidth in a slot can lease it out to a secondary for the duration of the slot, in return for an access fee of p i . A primary incurs a cost of c ≥ 0 per slot for leasing out bandwidth. This cost may arise, for example, if the secondary uses the primary's infrastructure to access the Internet. We assume that p i ≤ ν for each primary i for some constant ν > c. This upper bound ν may arise as follows.
(1) The valuation of each secondary for 1 unit of bandwidth may be ν, and no secondary will buy bandwidth at a price that exceeds its valuation. (2) Alternatively, the valuation of each secondary for 1 unit of bandwidth may be ν or greater, and the spectrum regulator may impose the upper bound of ν on prices to ensure that primaries do not excessively overprice bandwidth even when competition is limited owing to bandwidth scarcity or high demands from secondaries, or when the primaries collude. We assume that the primaries know this upper limit ν.
Secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer the lowest price. More precisely, in a given slot, let Z be the number of primaries who offer unused bandwidth. Then, since there are K secondaries, the bandwidth of the min(Z, K) primaries that offer the lowest prices is bought (ties are resolved at random).
Remark 1: The above trade among the primaries and the secondaries can be carried out in either a distributed or centralized manner, as we now explain. First, we describe two possible distributed implementations. In one, primaries with unused bandwidth in a region can announce the prices they quote in a web-portal (e.g., like Craigslist for sale of commodities) dedicated for this purpose. Secondaries can contact the primaries through this web-site in increasing order of prices until they locate one that has not yet sold its bandwidth. Alternatively, that is, if such a web-site cannot be maintained for a specific region, a secondary can learn of the availabilities and prices by directly contacting each of the primaries. It can subsequently contact those with available bandwidth in increasing order of the quoted prices, until it locates one that has not yet sold its bandwidth. However, in the above distributed implementations, a primary can potentially manipulate the trading process by waiting until all the other primaries announce their prices and setting its own price with the knowledge of the other primaries' prices. 1 To counter such manipulation, the spectrum regulator can either rule it as illegal and penalize primaries found indulging in it, or use a centralized implementation of the trading process such as the following. An agent first collects availabilities and price quotes from all the primaries and then announces them to the secondaries. The agent may, for example, be any entity acting on behalf of the spectrum regulator or simply a dedicated website maintained by the regulator. Also, note that the actions required from the agent are minimal-it merely has to collect availabilities and quotes from the primaries and announce them to secondaries-as compared to those required from the auctioneer (which has to run the auction-clearing algorithm) in double auction based spectrum trades.
Remark 2: For concreteness, we have assumed that the number of secondaries that seek bandwidth is K and each of these secondaries requires exactly one channel. However, it is easy to check that all the results in the paper apply without change to the more general scenario where a secondary may seek any non-negative integer number of channels (and is willing to accept any number less than or equal to the number of channels sought) by letting K be the total number of channels collectively sought by the secondaries, provided the above technical assumptions on the p.m.f., {γ k }, of K hold. We assume that a secondary does not seek fractional quantities of channels; however, the duration of the time slot for which channels are leased out can be chosen to be small enough that this does 1 As an example of such manipulation, suppose the number of secondaries, K, is a constant, say k. Then one of the primaries can set its price equal to p − , where p is the k'th smallest price among the prices of the other primaries and > 0 is a small number. This ensures that the primary's bandwidth is bought with certainty and the primary gets a large payoff. not significantly limit the flexibility of the channel allocation process. 2 If primary i has unused bandwidth, then the utility or payoff of primary i is defined to be its net revenue. 3 So the utility of a primary i who sets a price of p i equals p i − c if primary i's bandwidth is bought and 0 otherwise. Now, each primary i who has unused bandwidth, must decide the price p i to set. We allow each primary i to choose his price p i randomly from a set of prices using an arbitrary distribution function 4 (d.f.), ψ i (.), which is referred to as the strategy of primary i. The vector (ψ 1 (.), . . . , ψ n (.)) of strategies of the primaries is called a strategy profile [21] . Let
. . , ψ n (.)) denote the vector of strategies of the primaries other than i. Let E{u i (ψ i (.), ψ −i )} denote the expected utility of primary i when it adopts strategy ψ i (.) and the other primaries adopt ψ −i . Note that setting price p i = x with probability 1 constitutes the following strategy:
Let E{u i (x, ψ −i )} denote the expected utility of primary i if it sets its price p i to x with probability 1 and the other primaries use the strategy profile ψ −i . We use the Nash Equilibrium solution concept, which has been extensively used in game theory in general and wireless network applications in particular to predict the outcome of a game.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium (NE)):
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile such that no player can improve its expected utility by unilaterally deviating from its strategy [21] . Thus, (ψ *
Equation (2) says that when players other than i play ψ * −i , ψ * i (·) maximizes i's expected utility; ψ * i (·) is said to be a best response [21] of player i to ψ * −i . For later use, we also note that
, then p i is said to be a best response [21] of player i to ψ * −i . Note that the existence of a NE is not apriori clear, far less the uniqueness and characterization of NE strategy profiles. This is because the prices can take real values and hence the strategy sets of players are not finite. In addition, the utilities of the primaries are not continuous functions of their actions. For example, consider the game in which there are n = 2 primaries 2 Also note that the time slot duration must be sufficiently large so as to limit the fraction of every time slot that is spent in carrying out the trade among the primaries and secondaries using one of the mechanisms described in Remark 1. For example, in CRNs where primaries use or do not use their channels for several minutes or hours at a time, e.g., when they are television or radio broadcasters, a time slot duration of a few seconds may be used since the time required to complete the trading process would typically be of the order of a few milliseconds. 3 If instead, the utility were defined to be primary i's net revenue, unconditional on whether it has unused bandwidth or not, then the expressions for expected utility of primary i in the game analysis would all be scaled by q i . 4 Recall that the distribution function of a random variable (r.v.) X is the function G(x) = P (X ≤ x).
and K = 1 secondary with probability 1. If primary 1 has unused bandwidth, its expected utility is
which is a discontinuous function of the prices. Thus, classical results, including those for concave and potential games, do not establish the existence of NE in the resulting game, and there is no standard algorithm for finding a NE.
For convenience (see Remark 3), we define the pseudo-price of primary i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, p i , as the price it selects if it has unused bandwidth and p i = ν + 1 otherwise. 5 Also, let φ i (.) be the d.f. of p i . For c ≤ x ≤ ν, p i ≤ x for a primary i iff it has unused bandwidth and sets a price
and φ i (x) differ only by the constant factor q i ; so properties such as continuity, monotonicity etc are identical for both functions on the interval x ∈ [c, ν]. Hence, we use these two functions interchangeably wherever applicable.
Remark 3: We now explain why it is convenient to work with pseudo-prices
To analyze NE in the above price competition game, we need to extensively work with the expected payoffs of primaries (see Definition 1). The expected payoff of a primary i that has unused bandwidth and sets a given price p i depends on whether or not each of the other primaries has unused bandwidth in the slot and the prices set by the primaries that do have unused bandwidth. The concept of pseudo-price simplifies the analysis by allowing us to work with p j and φ j (·), j = i, instead of conditioning on whether or not each of the primaries other than i has unused bandwidth and working with the quantities p j and ψ j (·), j = i.
B. Necessary Conditions for a NE
Consider a NE under which the d.f. of the price (respectively, pseudo-price) of primary i is ψ i (.) (respectively, φ i (.)). In Theorem 1 below, we show that the NE strategies must have a particular structure. Before stating Theorem 1, we describe some basic properties of the NE strategies.
The proof of Property 1 is provided in Section II-E1. Thus, there does not exist a pure strategy NE (one in which every primary selects a single price with probability (w.p.) 1). Now, let u i,max be the expected payoff that primary i gets in the NE and L i be the lower endpoint of the support set 7 of ψ i (.), i.e.
Definition 2: Let w i be the probability of the event that at least K primaries among {1, . . . , n} \ i have unused bandwidth. Let r be the probability that K ≥ 1.
Note that r = 1 − γ 0 , and w i can be easily computed using the p.m.f {γ k } and the fact that each primary j independently has unused bandwidth w.p. q j .
Property 2:
The proof of Property 2 is provided in Section II-E1. Thus, the lower endpoints of the support sets of the d.f.s ψ 1 (.), . . . , ψ n (.) of all the primaries are the same and they get the same expected payoff in the NE. Intuitively, the reason u i,max = (p − c)r holds for each primary i is thatp turns out to be a best response 8 for each i in the NE, 9 and if primary i sets a price ofp, then it is not undercut by any other primary (since no primary plays a price lower thanp) and, ignoring 10 the zeroprobability event that a primary other than i sets a price exactlỹ p, primary i's bandwidth is sold iff K ≥ 1, which happens w.p. r.
Theorem 1: The following are necessary conditions for strategies φ 1 (.), . . . , φ n (.) to constitute a NE: 1) φ 1 (.), . . . , φ n (.) satisfy Property 1 and Property 2.
2) There exist numbers R j , j = 1, . . . , n, and a function
Also, every point in [p, R j ) is a best response for primary j and it plays every sub-interval in [p, R j ) with positive probability. Finally, R 1 = R 2 = ν. The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Section II-E1. Theorem 1 says that all n primaries play prices in the range [p, R n ), the d.f. φ n (.) of primary n stops increasing at R n , the remaining primaries 1, . . . , n − 1 also play prices in the range [R n , R n−1 ), the d.f. φ n−1 (.) of primary n − 1 stops increasing at R n−1 , and so on. Also, primary 1's d.f. φ 1 (.) has a jump of height q 1 − q 2 at ν if q 1 > q 2 . Finally, note that (apart from the jump 11 at ν + 1), the support set of φ i (·) is limited to the set [p, R i ] for each i = 1, . . . , n. Fig. 1 illustrates the structure.
C. Explicit Computation, Uniqueness and Sufficiency
By Theorem 1, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
8 See the paragraph after (2). 9 But note thatp is not the only best response for any primary i-see Theorem 1. 10 Note that the event that a primary sets price exactlyp occurs with probability 0 by Property 1. Hence, this event can be ignored while computing the expected payoff. 11 Recall that p i is defined to be ν + 1 if primary i does not have unused bandwidth; hence, φ i (·), which is the d.f. of p i , has a jump at ν + 1. So the candidate NE strategies φ 1 (.), . . . , φ n (.) are completely determined oncep, R 1 , . . . , R n and the function φ(.) are specified. Also, Property 2 provides the value ofp, and R 1 = R 2 = ν by Theorem 1. First, we will show that there also exist unique R 3 , . . . , R n and φ(.) satisfying (5), (6), and (7) and will compute them. Then, we will show that the resulting strategies given by (8) indeed constitute a NE (sufficiency).
Definition 3: Let p −i be the K'th smallest pseudo-price out of the pseudo-prices, {p l : l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, l = i}, of the primaries other than i (with
Since there are K secondaries, if primary 1 has unused bandwidth and sets p 1 = x ∈ [p, ν), its bandwidth is bought iff 12 p −1 > x, which happens w.p. 1 − F −1 (x). Note that primary 1's payoff is (x − c) if its bandwidth is bought and 0 otherwise. So
where the second equality follows from the facts that each x ∈ [p, ν) is a best response for primary 1 by Theorem 1, and u 1,max = (p − c)r by Property 2. By (9), we get
where,
Next, we calculate R i , i = 3, . . . , n and φ(.) using (10).
1) Computation of
be the probability of K or more successes out of n − 1 independent Bernoulli events, (i − 1) of which have the same success probability y and the remaining (n − i) have success probabilities q i+1 , . . . , q n .
An interpretation for f i (y) is as follows. First, note that for (8) and (5). Now, when primary 1 has unused bandwidth and sets
then from Definition 4, with the events {p j ≤ x}, j = 2, . . . , n as the n − 1 Bernoulli events, it follows that f i (y) is the probability that primary 1's bandwidth is not bought. The above fact is used below: (i) in (13) to compute R i , i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, [with x = R i and y = q i in (12)], and (ii) in (18) (12)]. An expression for f i (y) can be easily computed, using which it can be shown that (see our technical report [9] ):
is a continuous and strictly increasing function.
Intuitively, since the probability of individual successes increases with increase in y, so does the probability of K or more successes; hence, f i (·) is a strictly increasing function. Now, to compute R i , i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, we note that by (8) and (5)
So from Definition 4, with the events {p j ≤ R i }, j = 2, . . . , n as the n − 1 Bernoulli events, and by the definition of F −1 (.), we get
By (10) and (13) g(
By (11) and (14), R i is unique and given by
We now verify that the expression for R i in (15) is consistent with the necessity condition in (5) in Theorem 1. First, we show that R i ≥ R i+1 for i ∈ {3, . . . , n − 1}. From Definition 4 and since q i ≥ q i+1 by (15) , it is easy to check that f i (q i ) ≥ f i+1 (q i+1 ). So by (15) , R i ≥ R i+1 . Now, from Definition 4, it follows that f n (q n ) > P (K = 0) = 1 − r; so by (15) , R n >p. Also, from Definitions 2 and 4 and by (15) , it follows that w 1 ≥ f 3 (q 3 ). Hence, by (4) and (15), it follows that R 3 ≤ v. Thus, (15) is consistent with (5) .
2) Computation of φ(.): For convenience of exposition, let R n+1 =p. Now we compute the function {φ(.) : (8) and (5) 
By definition of the function f i (.), with the events {p j ≤ x}, j = 2, . . . , n as the n − 1 Bernoulli events, by definition of F −1 (x) and using P {p j ≤ x} = φ j (x), (16) and (17)
By (10) and (18) 
Due to space constraints, the proof of Lemma 2 is relegated to our technical report [9] .
Thus, there is a unique function φ(.), and by (8) , unique φ i (.), i = 1, . . . , n that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1.
3) Sufficiency:
. . , n given by (15) , and φ(.) being the solution of (19) , constitute the unique NE. The corresponding price d.f.s are
The proof of Theorem 2 is provided in Section II-E2. Thus, in the price competition game at a single location, there is a unique NE that can be computed explicitly. This NE fetches equal expected payoffs for each primary, which by Property 2 is given by
D. Discussion
The structure of the unique NE identified in Theorems 1 and 2 provides several interesting insights: 1) First, note that the support set of
in particular, primary i never sets a price greater than R i . From (15) and (5), it follows that only primaries with a high bandwidth availability probability (q) play high prices (see Fig. 1 ). Intuitively this is because all the primaries play low prices (nearp), so if a primary sets a high price, it is undercut by all the other primaries. But a primary with a high q runs a lower risk of being undercut than one with a low q because of the lower bandwidth availability probabilities of the set of primaries other than itself. For example, consider primaries 2 and 3. The bandwidth availability probabilities of the set of primaries other than primary 2 (respectively, 3) are
. . , q n are common to the two cases, but q 2 ≥ q 3 ; correspondingly, R 2 ≥ R 3 . 2) Second, by Property 1, ψ 1 (.) has a jump at ν iff q 1 > q 2 and is continuous everywhere else, whereas ψ 2 (.), . . . , ψ n (.) are always continuous on [c, ν] . From Property 1, it also follows that primary 1 sets price ν with probability:
Now, note that q 2 is the probability that primary 2 has unused bandwidth, and by (15) , it is also an upper bound on the probability that any given primary j = 1 has unused bandwidth. So (21) shows, consistent with intuition, that P (p 1 = ν) is decreasing in q 2 and, as q 2 → 0, primary 1 sets price ν, which is the price that it would set w.p. 1 in the absence of competition from the other primaries, with a probability that approaches 1. 3) Third, we compare the structure of the NE in Theorems 1 and 2 with that in the symmetric case q 1 = · · · = q n considered in [8] . In the symmetric case, every primary uses the same strategy, i.e., 
By the definition of stochastic larger, 13 (22) and (20), it follows that the expected payoff of each primary in the NE (is equal and) decreases as Z −1 , the number of primaries among {2, . . . , n} that have unused bandwidth, stochastically increases. This is consistent with intuition since as Z −1 stochastically increases, the price competition becomes more intense, driving down prices and revenues. (b) Next, fix j = 1 and let E j denote the event that primary j has unused bandwidth. Also, let G k denote the event that k or fewer primaries among {1, . . . , n} \ {1, j} have unused bandwidth. Using Definition 2, conditioning on whether or not the event E j occurs and simplifying, we get
Now, the expression in square brackets in the RHS of (23) is non-negative since
Combining this with (20) , and noting that by the assumption in (15) , q j is the j'th largest bandwidth availability probability, we conclude that the expected payoff of each primary in the NE is decreasing in the j'th largest bandwidth availability probability for each j = 2, . . . , n. Again this is consistent with intuition since as q j increases, the price competition becomes more intense, driving down the payoffs. However, surprisingly, by (20) and Definition 2, it follows that the expected payoffs of the primaries are independent of the largest bandwidth availability probability, q 1 . 13 Recall that if X and Y are random variables, then X is said to be stochastically larger than Y if for every real number a, P (X >a) ≥ P (Y >a) [27] .
(c) Similar to the derivation of (22), we get
By (24), the definition of stochastic larger and (20), it follows that the expected payoff of each primary in the NE increases as K, the number of secondaries, stochastically increases. Intuitively this is because the demand for bandwidth increases as K increases; so primaries tend to set higher prices.
E. Proofs of Analytical Results

1) Proofs of results in Section II-B:
We first prove a result, Lemma 3, which establishes some key continuity properties that the NE strategies ψ 1 (·), . . . , ψ n (·) must satisfy, and which we use extensively in the rest of this section. Next we prove Property 2 and then Property 1 and Theorem 1.
Lemma 3: For i = 1, . . . , n, ψ i (.) is continuous, except possibly at ν. Also, at most one primary has a jump at ν.
Proof: Suppose ψ i (.) has a jump at a point x 0 , c < x 0 < ν. Then for some > 0, no primary j = i chooses a price in [x 0 , x 0 + ] because it can get a strictly higher payoff by choosing a price just below x 0 instead. This in turn implies that primary i gets a strictly higher payoff at the price x 0 + than at x 0 . So x 0 is not a best response for primary i, which contradicts the assumption that ψ i (.) has a jump at x 0 . Thus, ψ i (.) is continuous at all x < ν. Now, suppose primary i has a jump at ν. Then a primary j = i gets a higher payoff at a price just below ν than at ν. So ν is not a best response for primary j and it plays it with 0 probability. Thus, at most one primary has a jump at ν. a) Proof of property 2: Let u i,max and L i be as defined in Section II-B. We prove Property 2 in Lemmas 5 and 7. In particular, Lemma 5 shows that L 1 = · · · = L n =p for some constantp ∈ (c, v) and u i,max = (p − c)r. Lemma 7 shows that the constantp is as in (4).
We first prove Lemma 4, which will be used to prove Lemma 5.
Lemma 4: (3), it plays prices just above L i with positive probability and they are best responses for him. So L i is also a best response for primary i.
That is, the lower endpoint of the support set of the price distribution of every primary is the same.
Proof: Let L min = min{L m : m = 1, . . . , n}, and S min = {m : L m = L min } be the set of primaries with the lowest endpoint. Let
Thus, k min is the minimum number of secondaries that seek bandwidth at a location. Note that k min will be 0 if γ 0 > 0, and k min > 0 otherwise. First, we show by contradiction that
Clearly, the above holds if k min = 0. We therefore show that it holds even otherwise. Suppose
then all primaries play the price ν w.p. 1, which does not constitute a NE by Lemma 3. So L min < ν and again by Lemma 3, no primary has a jump at L min . Also, by Lemma 4, L min is a best response for the primaries in S min . LetL = min{L m : m ∈ S min } be the second lowest endpoint. Now, a primary m ∈ S min who has unused bandwidth can get a higher payoff at a price just belowL than at L min because in both cases, since |S min | ≤ k min , primary m's bandwidth is sold w.p. 1; however, it gets a higher revenue at a price just beloŵ L than at L min . This contradicts the fact that L min is a best response for primary m. Thus, (25) must hold. Now, suppose L i < L j for some i, j. By Lemma 4, L j is a best response for primary j. Now, the expected payoff that primary j gets for p j = L j is strictly less than the expected payoff that primary i would get if it set p i to be just below L j . This is because, if primaries i or j set a price of approximately L j , then they see the same pseudo-price distribution functions of the primaries other than i and j. But primary j may be undercut by primary i, since L i < L j , whereas primary i may not be undercut by primary j. Also, by (25) , primary j's expected payoff is strictly lowered due to this undercutting by primary i. (Note that if k min > 0, undercutting by primary i would not lower primary j's probability of winning, and thereby the expected payoff, if a total of ≤ k min − 1 primaries played prices below L j with positive probability. This possibility is ruled out by (25) . If k min = 0, γ 0 > 0. If in addition γ 1 = 0, and S min = 1, it is possible that only 1 primary (i.e., i) plays prices below L j with positive probability. In this case, note that whenever at least 1 secondary is available, at least 2 secondaries are available (as γ 1 = 0), and hence undercutting by primary i does not lower primary j's probability of winning, and thereby the expected payoff. This possibility is ruled out by assumption
Now, by Lemma 4, L i is a best response for primary i. If primary j were to play price L i , then it would get a payoff of u i,max . This is because, when primary i plays price L i , it gets payoff u i,max . Since L j > L i , primary i is, w.p. 1, not undercut by primary j. If primary j were to set the price L i , then w.p. 1, it would not be undercut by primary i. Also, the pseudo-price distributions of the primaries other than i and j are exactly the same from the viewpoints of primaries i and j. Thus, primary j can strictly increase its payoff from u j,max to u i,max by playing price L i , which contradicts the fact that L j is a best response for him.
Thus,
By Lemma 4, a price ofp is a best response for every primary i. Since no primary sets a price lower thanp, a price ofp fetches a payoff ofp − c if K ≥ 1 and a payoff of 0 if K = 0. So
Let w i be as in Definition 2. Using (15), it can be easily shown
We now prove Lemma 6, which will be used to prove Lemma 7.
Lemma
That is, at least two primaries play prices just below ν with positive probability.
Proof: Suppose not. Fix i and let
By definition of y, ψ l (x) = 1 ∀l = i and x > y. Also, since ψ l (.) is a distribution function, it is right continuous [4] . So
Suppose y < ν. By (28)
So every price p i ∈ (y, ν) is dominated by p i = ν. Hence
By (29) and (30) P {p j ∈ (y, ν)} = 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
By (27) , ∀ > 0, ψ l (y − ) < 1 for at least one primary l = i; otherwise the infimum in the RHS of (27) would be less than y. So this primary l plays prices just below y with positive probability. Now, if primary l sets a price p l < ν, it gets a payoff equal to the revenue, (p l − c), if bandwidth is sold, times the probability that bandwidth is sold. Also, by Lemma 3, ψ j (.), j = 1, . . . , n are continuous at all prices below ν. So by (31), a price p l just below ν yields a higher payoff than a price just below y. This is because, p l − c is lower by approximately ν − y for p l just below y than for p l just below ν, but by (31) and continuity of ψ j (.), j = 1, . . . , n, the probability that bandwidth is sold for a price p l just below y can be made arbitrarily close to the probability that bandwidth is sold for a price p l just below ν. This contradicts the assumption that primary l plays prices just below y with positive probability.
Thus, y in (27) equals ν and hence at least one primary j = i plays prices just below ν with positive probability. The above arguments with j in place of i imply that at least one primary other than j plays prices just below ν with positive probability. Thus, at least two primaries in {1, . . . , n} play prices just below ν with positive probability.
Proof: If primary 1 sets the price p 1 = ν, then it gets an expected payoff of at least (ν − c)(1 − w 1 ) because its bandwidth is sold at least in the event that K − 1 or fewer primaries out of 2, . . . , n have unused bandwidth. So u 1,max ≥ (ν − c)(1 − w 1 ). Since u 1,max = (p − c)r by Lemma 5, we get
Now, by Lemma 6, at least two primaries, say m and j, play prices just below ν with positive probability. By Lemma 3, at most one of them has a jump at ν. So assume, WLOG, that no primary other than j has a jump at ν. Then a price of p j = ν is a best response for primary j and fetches a payoff of u j,max = (ν − c) ( w 1 ) , where the inequality follows from (26) . Since u j,max = (p − c)r by Lemma 5, we get
The result follows from (32) and (33). Property 2 follows from Lemmas 5 and 7.
Proof of Property 1 and Theorem 1:
We start by proving Lemma 8, which together with Lemma 3 proves most of Property 1.
Lemma 8: 2 and has a jump of size at most
Proof: If no primary i > 1 has a jump at ν, then primary 1 gets a payoff of (ν − c)(1 − w 1 ), which equals (p − c)r by Lemma 7, for a price p 1 just below ν in the limit as p 1 → ν−. So if a primary i ≥ 2 has a jump at ν, primary 1 can get a payoff strictly greater than (p − c)r by playing a price close enough to ν. This contradicts the fact that u 1,max = (p − c)r (see Lemma 5) . Thus, no primary i ≥ 2 has a jump at ν and φ 2 (.), . . . , φ n (.) are continuous.
First, suppose q 1 = q 2 . If primary 1 has a jump at ν, then similar to the preceding paragraph, primary 2 can get a payoff strictly greater than (p − c)r by playing a price just below ν, which contradicts the fact that u 2,max = (p − c)r. So ψ 1 (.) is continuous. Now suppose q 1 > q 2 . First, suppose primary 1 has a jump of size exactly q 1 − q 2 at ν. Then if primary 2 sets a price just below ν, then the probability of being undercut by primary j ∈ {3, . . . , n} is approximately q j . Also, since primary 1 has a jump of size q 1 − q 2 at ν, the probability of being undercut by primary 1 is approximately q 1 − (q 1 − q 2 ) = q 2 . So at a price just below ν, primary 2 sees the same set of probabilities of being undercut by primaries other than itself as primary 1 would see if it set a price just below ν. Hence, by the first paragraph of this proof, primary 2 gets a payoff of approximately (p − c)r at a price just below ν.
Hence, if primary 1 has a jump of size, not equal to, but greater than q 1 − q 2 at ν, primary 2 gets a payoff of strictly greater than (p − c)r at a price just below ν. This contradicts the fact that u 2,max = (p − c)r.
Thus, primary 1 has a jump of at most size q 1 − q 2 at ν.
This, along with φ 1 (ν) = q 1 , gives (34). continuous at every x ∈ [c, ν) ; also, it is continuous at ν if q 1 = q 2 and has a jump of size at most q 1 −q 2 if q 1 > q 2 . Note that to complete the proof of Property 1, it only remains to show that when q 1 > q 2 , the jump of φ 1 (·) at ν is exactly q 1 − q 2 . This is shown later in Lemma 13.
By Lemmas 3 and 8: (
Next, we prove three auxiliary results (Lemmas 9, 10, and 11), which are then used to prove Part 2 of Theorem 1 in Lemma 12. Let F −i (x) be as in Definition 3.
Lemma 9: For a fixed x ∈ (p, ν], and primaries i and j,
Intuitively, Lemma 9 holds because by Definition 3, F −i (·) and F −j (·) are the d.f.s of the K'th smallest out of n − 1 pseudo-prices, n − 2 of which are common, and the remaining one is p j and p i respectively; so the probability that the K'th smallest out of the n − 1 preudo-prices is ≤ x is increasing in the probability that this remaining one is ≤ x. The formal proof of Lemma 9 is algebraic and we relegate it to our technical report [9] . Now, in a sequence of two lemmas, we prove that each primary plays prices in every sub-interval of its support set with positive probability-a result that will be used to prove part 2 of Theorem 1. The following lemma generalizes Lemma 6. 
. , n.
By definition of a, at least one primary, say primary i, plays prices just below a with positive probability. (If not, then the infimum in (35) would be less than a.) This implies that at least one primary j = i plays prices in (a, b) with positive probability. (If not, then p i = b would yield a strictly higher payoff to primary i than prices just below a.) Now, if primary j is the only primary among primaries {1, . . . , n} who play prices in (a, b) with positive probability, then p j = b yields a strictly higher payoff than p j ∈ (a, b), which is a contradiction. So at least two primaries play prices in (a, b) with positive probability. But P {p l ∈ [a, a]} = 0 ∀l = 1, . . . , n by definition of a. Hence, at least two primaries play prices in (a, b) with positive probability.
Lemma 11: Ifp ≤ x < y < ν and ψ i (x) = ψ i (y) for some primary i, then ψ i (ν−) = ψ i (x).
Thus, if x ≥p is the left endpoint of an interval of constancy of ψ i (.) for some i, then to the right of x, the interval of constancy extends at least until v (there may be a jump at v).
Proof: Suppose not, i.e.,
Let
By (36) and (37), we get y < ν. So by Lemma 3, no primary among {1, . . . , n} \ i has a jump at y. Also, primary i uses prices just above y with positive probability (if not, the supremum in the RHS of (37) would be > y). So y is a best response for primary i and hence
where the last equality follows from Lemma 5. Now, by Lemma 10, there exists a primary j = i who plays prices just below y with positive probability. Since no primary among {1, . . . , n} \ j has a jump at y, y is a best response for primary j. Hence
By (38) and (39), F −i (y) = F −j (y). So by Lemma 9
But since primary j plays prices just below y with positive probability, there exists > 0 such that x < y − and y − is a best response for primary j. So
But by (37) and the continuity of φ i (.) at y
By (40), (41) and (42), φ i (y − ) > φ j (y − ). So by Lemma 9
This implies
which contradicts the fact that every primary gets a payoff of (p − c)r at a best response in the NE. Lemma 12: Part 2 of Theorem 1 holds. Due to space constraints, we relegate the proof of Lemma 12 to our technical report [9] . Now, Lemma 8 showed that if q 1 > q 2 , then φ 1 (.) has a jump of size at most q 1 − q 2 at ν. The following lemma shows that the size of the jump is in fact exactly q 1 − q 2 .
Lemma 13: If q 1 > q 2 , then φ 1 (.) has a jump of size q 1 − q 2 at ν.
Proof: By Lemma 12, φ 1 (x) = φ 2 (x) for all x < R 2 = ν. So
Finally, (i) Property 1 follows from Lemmas 3, 8 and 13; and (ii) Theorem 1 follows from Properties 1 and 2 and Lemma 12.
2) Proofs of Results in Section II-C:
Proof of Theorem 2: By Lemma 2 and equation (8), the functions φ i (.), i = 1, . . . , n computed in Section II-C are continuous and non-decreasing on [p, ν]; also, φ i (p) = 0 and φ i (ν) = q i . This is consistent with the fact that φ i (.) is the d.f. of the pseudo-price p i and hence should be non-decreasing and right continuous [4] , and φ i (ν) = q i ψ i (ν) = q i (see the last paragraph of Section II-A). Now, we have shown in Section II-B and C that (8) is a necessary condition for the functions φ i (.), i = 1, . . . , n to constitute a NE. We now show sufficiency. Suppose for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, primary i uses the strategy φ i (.) in (8) . Similar to the derivation of (9), the expected payoff that primary i gets at a price x ∈ [p, ν) is
, and hence by Lemma 9, F −i (x) = F −1 (x). By (9), (43) and the fact that
, which by (9) and (43) implies
Finally, note that a price belowp fetches a payoff of less than (p − c)r for primary i. So each price in [p, R i ) is a best response for primary i; also, by (8) , it randomizes over prices only in this range under φ i (.). So φ i (.) is a best response. Thus, the functions φ i (.), i = 1, . . . , n constitute a NE.
III. MULTIPLE LOCATIONS
We now characterize NE in the game with spatial reuse by combining the results obtained for the single location model in Section II with those for the symmetric case q 1 = · · · = q n in our prior work [8] . We present the system model in Section III-A, which is similar to that in [8] , but included for completeness. In Section III-B, we review mean valid graphs, which were introduced in [8] , and characterize an NE in mean valid graphs in Section III-C. We present a result characterizing the threshold behavior of the NE in the limit as n → ∞ in Section III-D and prove the analytical results provided in Section III-C and D in Section III-E.
Our analysis in this section shows that for the asymmetric case, where q 1 , . . . , q n are not equal, the strategies that different primaries use for selecting the locations at which to offer bandwidth in the NE are similar to those in the symmetric case considered in [8] , but the strategies for selecting the price of bandwidth at a given location are very different. In addition, the threshold behavior of the NE was not analyzed in [8] -we provide this analysis in this section.
A. Model
We now generalize the model described in Section II-A to the case of multiple locations. Each of the n primaries now owns a channel throughout a large region, such as a town.
14 In every slot, each primary independently either uses its channel throughout the region to satisfy its own subscriber demand, or does not use it anywhere in the region. A typical scenario where this happens is when primaries broadcast the same signal over the entire region, e.g., if they are television or radio broadcasters. As before, let q i ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that primary i does not use its channel in a slot, where q 1 , . . . , q n satisfy (15). Now, the region contains smaller parts, which we refer to as locations. For example, the large region may be a town, which may be divided into small areas similar to cells in a cellular network, which constitute the locations. Now, the number of secondaries at different locations may be different. Let the number of secondaries at location v be K v , which is a random variable with p.m.f. P r(K v = k) = γ k . Also, the random variables K v at different locations v may be correlated. We continue to make the technical assumptions on the p.m.f. {γ k } stated in Section II-A.
A primary who has unused bandwidth in a slot can lease it out to secondaries at a subset of the locations, provided this subset satisfies the spatial reuse constraints, which we describe next. The overall region can be represented by an undirected graph [28] G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges, called the conflict graph, in which each node represents a location, and there is an edge between two nodes iff transmissions at the corresponding locations interfere with each other. Recall that an independent set [28] (I.S.) in a graph is a set of nodes such that there is no edge between any pair of nodes in the set. Now, a primary who is not using its channel must offer it at a set of mutually non-interfering locations, or equivalently, at an I.S. of nodes; otherwise secondaries 15 will not be able to successfully transmit simultaneously using the bandwidth they purchase, owing to mutual interference.
A primary i who offers bandwidth at an I.S. I, must also determine for each node v ∈ I, the access fee, p i,v , to be charged to a secondary if the latter leases the bandwidth at node v. Similar to Section II-A, we assume that a primary incurs a cost of c ≥ 0 per slot per node for leasing out bandwidth. Also, p i,v ≤ ν for each primary i and each node v, for some constant ν > c. As before, secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer the lowest price.
We consider an additive utility function for the primaries, which is natural in the context of monetary profits. So the utility of a primary i who has unused bandwidth, offers it at an I.S. I and sets a price of p i,v at node v ∈ I is given by (p i,v − c) , where the summation is over the nodes v ∈ I at which primary i's bandwidth is bought. (The utility is 0 if bandwidth is not bought at any node).
Thus, each primary must jointly select an I.S. at which to offer bandwidth, and the prices to set at the nodes in it. Both the I.S. and price selection may be random. Thus, a strategy, say ψ i , of a primary i provides a p.m.f. for selection among the I.S., and the price distribution it uses at each node (both selections contingent on having unused bandwidth). Note that we allow a primary to use different (and arbitrary) price distributions for different nodes (and therefore allow, but do not require, the selection of different prices at different nodes), and arbitrary p.m.f. (i.e., discrete distributions) for selection among the different I.S. The notations (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) , Remark 4: A typical scenario in which the above model is applicable is when primary users are television or radio broadcasters and secondary users are providers of telephone and/or Internet service. Note that in this case, the coverage range of the primary users would be much larger than that of secondary users, since primary users would be broadcasting the same signal (e.g., a TV or radio channel) throughout a large region such as a town, whereas secondary users would use tens or hundreds of cells (locations) in the town (region) to enhance capacity via frequency reuse [26] . Several futuristic scenarios to which the above model applies can also be envisioned. For example, primary users may be owners of spectrum throughout a large shopping complex, corporate park or residential complex and secondary users may be providers of spectrum in individual shops, company buildings or houses within them.
We now provide a separation framework from which the price distributions at individual nodes follow once the I.S. selection p.m.f.s are determined. Let I be the set of all I.S. in G. For convenience, we assume that the empty I.S. I ∅ ∈ I and we allow a primary to offer bandwidth at I ∅ , i.e. to not offer bandwidth at any node, with some probability. Consider a NE under which, if primary i has unused bandwidth, it selects I.S. Thus, the strategy profile of the primaries in an NE is completely specified once the I.S. selection p.m.f. {β i (I) : I ∈ I , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} (which will in turn provide the α i v s via (44)) is obtained.
Henceforth, for simplicity, we normalize ν − c = 1.
B. Mean Valid Graphs
We now briefly review mean valid graphs, which we introduced in our prior work [8] , and which model the conflict graphs of several topologies that commonly arise in practice.
Definition 5 (Mean Valid Graph): An assignment {α v : v ∈ V } of probabilities to the nodes is said to be a valid distribution if there exists a probability distribution {β(I) : I ∈ I } such that for each v ∈ V , α v = I∈I :v∈I β(I). We refer to a graph G = (V, E) as mean valid if: 1) Its vertex set can be partitioned into d disjoint maximal 16 I.S. for some integer d ≥ 2:
2) For every valid distribution 17 in which a primary who has unused bandwidth offers it at node a j,l w.p. 
Thus, Condition 2 in Definition 5 says that in G, the distribution of means corresponding to every valid distribution is a valid distribution-a fact that we extensively use in the proofs of the characterization of a NE in mean valid graphs.
We showed in Section III in [8] that the following graphs, which commonly arise in practice, are mean valid: line graphs, two and three dimensional grid graphs, the conflict graph of a cellular network with hexagonal cells and a clique of size e ≥ 1 [8] . As a specific example of mean valid graphs, consider the m × m grid graph, which we denote as H m,m , in part (a) of 
C. Existence and Computation of a NE in Mean Valid Graphs
Let G be a mean valid graph with d disjoint maximal I.S. I 1 , . . . , I d . We start by considering a class of simple strategy profiles. Every primary selects I.S. I j with probability t j where {t j : j = 1, . . . , d} represents a p.m.f., i.e, d j=1 t j = 1 and t j ≥ 0 for each j. We first evaluate the expected payoff of a primary under an NE in the above class. We introduce some notations towards that end. Since primary i has unused bandwidth w.p. q i and offers it at node v ∈ I j w.p. t j , it offers bandwidth at node v ∈ I j w.p. q i t j . Analogous to the w i s that we introduced in Section II-B, we introduce w(t j ) that represents the probability that K v or more out of primaries 2, . . . , n offer bandwidth at a given node v ∈ I j under the above I.S. p.m.f. {t j : j = 1, . . . , d}. Under this p.m.f, by Lemma 14, and similar to (20) in the single location case, the primaries choose the price at each node in I j as per the single-node NE strategy with q 1 t j , . . . , q n t j in place of q 1 , . . . , q n respectively throughout, and each primary obtains an expected payoff of W (t j ) at that node, where 
We now state the main result of this section, which establishes the existence of a NE and also shows how it can be explicitly computed.
Theorem 3: In a mean valid graph, the strategy profile in which each primary who has unused bandwidth selects I.S. where (t 1 , . . . , t d ) is the unique distribution that satisfies (48) and (49), constitutes a NE. Also,
The proof of Theorem 3 is outlined in Section III-E1. We now explain Theorem 3. Since at each location, there exists at least one secondary w.p. r, whenever a primary offers bandwidth at a location, its expected payoff at that location is r or less. Thus, by (45) Theorem 3 implies that every mean valid graph has a NE, which can be explicitly computed by solving the system of equations (48) 
We now compare the structure of the NE characterized in Theorem 3 with that in the symmetric case, q 1 = · · · = q n , which we analyzed in our prior work [8] . The I.S. selection strategies under the NE in Theorem 3 are very similar to those in the symmetric case; in particular, only the expression for W (·) in (49) changes. However, the pricing strategy at each location is governed by the asymmetric case single location pricing strategy ψ i (.) computed in Section II, which is very different from the symmetric case single location pricing strategy that is the basis for the pricing in the symmetric case.
Next, we explain why the NE I.S. selection strategies in the asymmetric case are similar to those in the symmetric case. In the asymmetric case, different primaries select the same node with different probabilities because they have different bandwidth availability probabilities. But, the NE price selection strategy at each node allocates equal payoffs to all primaries regardless (see (20) ). So the payoffs of all primaries at any given I.S. are identical and hence, primaries are effectively symmetric with respect to their I.S. selection strategies.
We now illustrate the NE in Theorem 3 using an example. Example 1: Suppose there are n = 2 primaries with probabilities of having unused bandwidth q 1 and q 2 , where q 1 ≥ q 2 , and K v = 1 secondary w.p. 1 at every node v. Consider a grid graph H m,m , which was introduced in Section III-B, with m = 7 (see part (a) of Fig. 2 ). This is a mean valid graph (see [8, Theorem 1] ) and, in the notation of Definition 5, d = 4, the I.S. I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , and I 4 are as shown in part (a) of Fig. 2 , and M 1 = 16, M 2 = M 3 = 12, M 4 = 9. In the NE characterized in Theorem 3, it turns out that d , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , and t 4 are independent 21 of q 1 , and their values for different q 2 ∈ (0, 1) are as follows:
Note that t 1 ≥ t 2 ≥ t 3 ≥ t 4 for each value of q 2 , consistent with Theorem 3. Also, t 2 = t 3 for all q 2 , which is consistent with (50). The plot in the right in Fig. 2 shows t 1 , t 2 and t 4 versus q 2 . For small q 2 , primaries offer bandwidth at the largest I.S. I 1 with probability 1; but as q 2 increases, the competition at I 1 increases, inducing the primaries to shift probability mass from I 1 to the other I.S. So t 1 decreases in q 2 . However, note that for all values of q 2 , t 1 ≥ t 2 ≥ t 4 and t 4 is very small (less than 0.02).
Recall that in Theorem 2, we showed that in the case of price competition at a single location, there is a unique NE. Now we show that in the case of price competition over multiple locations, there may be multiple NE in general. For example, consider the simple setup with two nodes v 1 and v 2 connected by an edge, two primaries and one secondary with probability 1 at each node. It can be easily verified that both of the following strategy profiles constitute NEs: primary 1 offers bandwidth at node v 1 (respectively, v 2 ) if it has unused bandwidth and primary 2 at node v 2 (respectively, v 1 ) if it has unused bandwidth, and both primaries set the maximum possible price of ν. Also, there is a third NE, which is of the form in Theorem 3.
In fact, it is easy to show using Definition 5 that the conflict graph in the above example is mean valid. Nevertheless, the NE in Theorem 3 turns out to be the unique one in a large class of strategy profiles, which we define next. Definition 6: Let S be the class of strategy profiles in which every primary uses the same distribution (p.m.f.) to select the independent set at which to offer bandwidth.
Lemma 15: The NE characterized in Theorem 3 is unique in class S.
The proof of Lemma 15 is outlined in Section III-E1. Note that in a strategy profile in class S, primaries may choose I.S. other than I 1 , . . . , I d . The above lemma rules out the choice of any such I.S. under an NE.
D. Threshold Behavior
We first define the efficiency, η, of a NE as η = R NE /R OPT , where R NE is the expected sum of payoffs of the n primaries at the NE and R OPT is the maximum possible (optimal) expected sum of payoffs, attained when all primaries jointly select the independent sets and prices to maximize their aggregate revenue. Clearly, η ≤ 1 quantifies the loss in aggregate revenue incurred owing to lack of cooperation among primaries. Also, since the above NE is unique (overall for the single location game and in class S for multiple locations), η quantifies fundamental limits on the performance of NE in the respective categories.
Let lim n→∞ n i=1 (q i /n) = q for some q ∈ (0, 1). Here, q represents the "average" bandwidth availability probability of the primaries. For simplicity, we assume that each secondary from a given pool independently seeks bandwidth, and let k n be the expected number of secondaries at any given location. 22 Then, the NE structure exhibits interesting threshold behavior as n → ∞; in particular, η switches from 1 to 0 depending on the relations between nq (availability) and k n (demand).
When there are n primaries, letp jn denote the common lower endpoint of the price distributions of the primaries who have unused bandwidth in the NE at nodes in I.S. I j (if they select I.S. I j ). Also, let d n and t mn , m ∈ {1, . . . , d} denote d and t m respectively in Theorem 3.
Lemma 16: Intuitively, Lemma 16 says that if availability is less than demand, then owing to limited competition, primaries with available bandwidth select only the maximum-sized I.S. among I 1 , . . . , I d , and choose prices in a neighborhood of ν. Thus, η → 1, since no other strategy can enhance any primary's payoff. As availability increases, under NE, primaries diversify their choices among the I.S. I 1 , . . . , I d and are more likely to select low prices as well (the lower limits of the price distributions hover around c once availability exceeds demand), thereby drastically reducing the efficiency of the NE.
Note also that cases (1) and (2) in Example 1 illustrate the fact that t j can be 0 for the smaller-sized I.S. I j in the NE when availability is limited. Case (3) shows that primaries select all the I.S. with non-zero probabilities when availability increases.
The above properties of the NE imply that when availability is low relative to demand: (i) secondary users at the small-sized I.S. are starved of bandwidth, since primary users never offer bandwidth at those locations, and (ii) even the secondaries at the large-sized I.S., at which bandwidth is offered, have to pay high prices to obtain it. Conversely, when availability is high relative to demand, profits of primaries from sale of their unused 22 We allow (but do not require) the number (rather statistics) of the secondaries to scale with increase in n. spectrum are low. Thus, the number of primaries in the region (relative to the number of secondaries) crucially impacts the availability of spectrum to secondary users as well as the profits of all players-primaries as well as secondaries.
A spectrum regulator may benefit from the above observations while allocating spectrum to primary users in a region and while framing regulations for the operation of the secondary market. For example, as discussed above, bandwidth starvation of secondaries may occur at some locations; hence, a regulator who intends to make bandwidth available to secondaries at all locations cannot rely solely on primaries offering their unused spectrum; the regulator must make some alternative provision such as making some spectrum other than that owned by the primaries available to the secondaries or mandating that primaries must offer bandwidth at every location with at least a prescribed minimum probability.
E. Proofs of Analytical Results
1) Proofs of results in Section III-C:
In this section, we briefly outline the proofs of Theorem 3 and Lemma 15. The proof of the corresponding result, [8, Theorem 2] , which computes and proves the uniqueness of the symmetric NE for the symmetric bandwidth availabilities case relies on the following facts:
1) the payoffs of all primaries at a given I.S. are equal, and 2) W (·) is a strictly decreasing function. Both these hold in the asymmetric case as well. In particular, we showed in Section III-C that 1 holds. To show 2, let w(·) be as defined in the first paragraph of Section III-C, i.e., when primary i ∈ {1, . . . , n} offers bandwidth w.p. q i α v at node v, then w(α v ) is the probability that K v or more primaries out of primaries 2, . . . , n offer bandwidth at node v. We have the following result:
Lemma 17: w(α) is a strictly increasing function of α on [0, 1]. Due to space constraints, we relegate the proof of Lemma 17 to our technical report [9] . By Lemma 17 and (47), it follows that W (·) is strictly decreasing. Thus, we have shown 2. Now, using 1 and 2, the proofs of Theorem 3 and Lemma 15 follow using arguments identical to those in the proof of Theorem 2 in [8] ; we relegate the proofs to our technical report [9] .
2) Proof of Lemma 16: When there are n primaries, let w n (.) and W n (.) denote the functions w(.) and W (.), respectively, defined in Section III-C. First, we note that For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ W n (α) ≤ r and W n (0) = r.
Equation (51) follows from (47), and the facts that w n (0) = 1 − r and W n (·) is a strictly decreasing function.
Proof of Part 1 of Lemma 16:
Note that for all large enough n, for each i, (( n j=1 q j − q i )/z) < (n − 1)q/z + (n − 1) /2z. Thus, if each primary selects an I.S. w.p. 1/z, for a given primary with available bandwidth, the expected number of primaries among the rest minus the expected number of secondaries is less than −(n−1) /2z. Clearly, then, w n (1/z) → 0 as n → ∞ (convergence is exponentially fast by Hoeffding's inequality [5] ). Thus, W n (1/z) → 1 as n → ∞. Thus, for all large enough n, M 1 W n (1/z) = M 2 W n (1/z) = . . . M z W n (1/ z) > M z+1 r. Thus, (1/z, . . . , 1/z, 0, . . . , 0) satisfies the requisite equations for the symmetric NE I.S. selection p.m.f. The Proof of part 2c: Due to space constraints, the proof of part 2c is relegated to our technical report [9] .
Proof of Part 3 of Lemma 16: Clearly, t 1n ≥ 1/d. Thus, t 1n q ≥ k n /(n − 1) + /d. Now, for all large enough n, for each i, n j=1 t 1n q j − t 1n q i > (n − 1)t 1n q − t 1n (n − 1) /(2d). Thus, if a given primary with available bandwidth selects I 1 , then the expected number of other primaries he sees at a node there minus the expected number of secondaries is greater than (n − 1) /(2d). Clearly then, w n (t 1n ) → 1 as n → ∞ (convergence is exponentially fast by Hoeffding's inequality [5] ). Thus, W n (t 1n ) → 0 and M 1 W n (t 1n ) → 0 as n → ∞. Thus, M 1 W n (t 1n ) < M d r for all large enough n. Thus, d n = d. So for j = 1, . . . , d, M j W n (t jn ) = M 1 W n (t 1n ) → 0 as n → ∞ and hencep jn → c. Thus, the second part of the lemma holds. Since M 1 W n (t 1n ) → 0 as n → ∞, expected utility of each primary approaches 0, and the approach is exponentially fast. Thus, the overall expected utility of all primaries approach 0. Clearly, the expected utility attained by OPT is bounded away from 0. The result follows.
IV. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this section, we describe numerical computations that are directed towards assessing the impact of price competition among the primaries on the aggregate revenue of the primaries and the affordability of spectrum for the secondaries. We consider the specific case of a grid graph H m,m (see Section III-B). This is a mean valid graph and, in the notation of Definition 5, d = 4 and the I.S. I 1 , I 2 , I 3 and I 4 are as described in Section III-B. Throughout, we use the parameter values ν = 1 and c = 0, and a constant number of secondaries k at each node. Also, q 1 , . . . , q n are uniformly spaced in [q L , q H ] for some parameters q L and q H . Let q = (q L + q H )/2 be the mean bandwidth availability probability of the primaries.
In H m,m , the NE is of the form in Theorem 3 and the plot on the left in Fig. 3 reveals, as expected, that price competition significantly reduces the aggregate revenue of the primaries under this NE relative to OPT, the optimal scheme in which the primaries collaborate 23 to attain R OPT , the maximum aggregate revenue of the primaries. 24 Also, overall, the efficiency (η) decreases as q increases since the competition increases. The plot on the right in Fig. 3 shows that the trends are similar for a larger topology (larger m).
The plots in Fig. 4 show, for different parameter values, that under price competition, the expected price per unit of bandwidth is lower at the nodes in the larger I.S. This is because primaries prefer larger I.S. and hence the competition is more intense there, driving down the prices.
V. CONCLUSION
We analyzed price competition among primaries in a CRN with a random number of secondaries taking into account bandwidth uncertainty and spatial reuse. For the game at a single location, we explicitly computed a NE and showed its uniqueness in the class of all NE. Also, for the game with spatial reuse, we computed a NE in mean valid graphs and showed its uniqueness in the class of NE with symmetric independent set selection strategies of the primaries. Our analysis provides several insights, e.g., there is randomization in the selection of prices by the primaries in the NE, and there exists a NE of simple form in mean valid graphs, in which primaries select only a small number of independent sets with positive probability.
An open problem for future research is to investigate the existence, computation and uniqueness of NE in general graphs, i.e., graphs that need not be mean valid. Also, in this paper, we have assumed that each primary owns one channel, secondaries do not seek fractional quantities of channels, and a secondary is able to operate on the channel of each of the primaries (when not in use by the corresponding primary). The scenarios in which (i) different primaries may own multiple and different numbers of channels, (ii) secondaries may seek fractional quantities of channels, and (iii) a given secondary is only able to operate on a subset of the channels owned by the primaries constitute interesting directions for future research.
